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New Hampshire Got it Right:
Statutes, Case Law and Related Issues Involving PostSecondary Education Payments and Divorced Parents
RYAN C. LEONARD*
I. INTRODUCTION
Divorced parents in New Hampshire can rest a little easier these days.
While there are a myriad of economic reasons why a divorce can become
contentious, financing a child’s college education can no longer be included among those reasons. In January 2004, in a rather bold and unconventional move, the New Hampshire legislature overruled years of legal
precedent and enacted a new statutory amendment that should alleviate
some of the financial pressures divorced parents inevitably face. The
amendment, RSA § 458:17(XI-a), is a victory for divorcees across the state
because it prohibits superior court judges from issuing orders forcing divorced parents to contribute to their adult child’s college expenses.1
The best interest of the child rule is consistently invoked by American
courts when dealing with children in custody disputes because courts have
an overriding interest in protecting a child’s welfare.2 Generally, this rule
is applied with the best of intentions. However, the best interest of the
child rule should never be considered when dealing with post-secondary
education payments. By ordering divorced parents to support their adult
children, courts across the country continue to violate the constitutional
rights of those parents. Treating similarly situated people the same should
be the goal of our legal system. Ordering divorced adults to pay or contribute to their child’s college expenses, when no such order can be made
of married adults, does not accomplish this goal. As a result of these unjust orders, the equal protection rights of divorced parents are consistently
violated throughout this country. The New Hampshire legislature recognized the inequality of these judicial orders and recently amended the law.3
* J.D., 2005, Franklin Piece Law Center, Concord, N.H.; B.S., 2001, The College of New Jersey,
Ewing, N.J. I am currently employed at Geoff Gray, LLC in Salem, NH. I would like to thank the
members of the Pierce Law Review, particularly Douglas Edmunds, Paul Homer and Alison Bethel, for
their constructive criticism and helpful feedback.
1. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:17 (XI-a) (2004).
2. E.g. Sanborn v. Sanborn, 465 A.2d 888, 892 (N.H. 1983) (an example of a New Hampshire case
that used the best interest of the child standard in a custody dispute).
3. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:17 (XI-a).
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Now is the time for all other states that do not have similar laws currently
in place to follow suit.
Over the last fifty years, divorce has become commonplace in American society with divorces doubling over that time, from 2.3 divorces per
1,000 people in 1955, to 4.6 divorces per 1,000 people in 2001.4 Divorce
rates now are around fifty percent nationwide.5 As a result, stigmas once
associated with divorce have all but disappeared. However, one stigma
still remains in some states: requiring divorced parents to pay for college
education expenses of their children.6
By ordering married couples to pay for their child’s college education,
states would be viewed as interfering with the sanctity of marriage. As a
result, states do not impose limits on parents’ decision-making as it relates
to a child’s upbringing. Therefore, every intact family is free to decide
whether a child will go to college, where the child will go, how payments
will be made, and who will contribute to the expenses. Even with the college tuition burden falling by about one-third since 1998, the decision
about how to pay for college should be resolved by the child’s parents,
whether married or divorced, at the time a child is eligible to go to college
since higher education expenses take a large portion out of most families’
income.7 Judges should not be able to order a parent who is, and always
will be, unwilling to pay for college expenses to make payments solely
because he or she is no longer married. Parents should be free to provide
for current and future college expenses to the best of their ability at the
time a child reaches the appropriate age; they should never be required to
do so.
This article will use the recent New Hampshire amendment, prohibiting judges from ordering parents to pay for college expenses, as a backdrop for advocating that all states pass similar statutes. Part II of this article begins with a discussion of the state of the law in New Hampshire before the statute was amended in 2004. Next, the article discusses the relevant portions of the recent New Hampshire amendment. The article next
outlines laws from various states in order to compare and contrast views
from the rest of the country. In Part III, the focus shifts to the equal protection arguments both for and against divorced parents in relation to manda4. Americans for Divorce Reform, Divorce Rates, http://www.divorcereform.org/03statab.html
(accessed May 22, 2006).
5. Id. at http://www.divorcereform.org/rates.html (accessed May 22, 2006) (the fifty percent rate is
the U.S. Census Bureau’s estimate for 2002).
6. See e.g. 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 513(a)(2) (2005); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 240 (1-b)(c)(7) (McKinney 2003); Hale v. Hale, 132 P.2d 67, 69 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 1942) (examples of states that require
parents to pay for their child’s college education).
7. Dennis Cauchon, Tuition Burden Falls by a Third (June 28, 2004) (available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2004-06-28-tuition-burden-cover-usat_x.htm.
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tory post-secondary education orders. Part IV of this article will analyze
the laws from various states and address problems courts have either failed
to address or have inadequately addressed. Finally, this article concludes
by advocating in favor of the New Hampshire amendment and arguing that
other states should follow New Hampshire’s lead and adopt similar versions of RSA § 458:17(XI-a).
II. COMPARISON OF POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION LAWS
A. Pre-Amendment New Hampshire Law
Prior to January 2004, the New Hampshire legislature gave state superior court judges broad discretionary powers in relation to the support,
maintenance, and custody of children of divorce.8 The law, in relevant
part, stated, “[i]n all cases where there shall be a decree of divorce . . . the
court shall make such further decree in relation to the support, education,
and custody of the children . . . and may order a reasonable provision for
their support and education.”9 “This provision had been part of New
Hampshire law for well over a century.”10
LeClair v. LeClair11 is the seminal New Hampshire case regarding
post-secondary education support.12 The parties in LeClair got divorced
when their son Jeremy was five years old.13 Subsequently, Jeremy lived
with his father until the age of sixteen when he moved in with his mother.14
However, communication between Jeremy’s parents after the divorce was
so poor that they did not discuss his college choice with each other.15 Once
Jeremy decided to attend college, his mother filed a petition with the superior court requesting that her ex-husband be ordered to make a reasonable
contribution toward their son’s college expenses.16 Jeremy’s father fought
the petition, alleging that he did not have sufficient assets to make a substantial contribution to any expenses.17
The superior court disagreed with Mr. LeClair’s arguments and, after
reviewing both parties’ financial situations, ordered him to contribute more

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

In re Breault, 821 A.2d 1118, 1121 (N.H. 2003).
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:17(I) (1992, amended 1993, repealed 2004).
LeClair v. LeClair, 624 A.2d 1350, 1353 (N.H. 1993).
624 A.2d 1350.
Id. at 1353.
Id. at 1352.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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than eight thousand dollars to Jeremy’s education. In determining each
party’s share of the tuition costs, the superior court took the total tuition
cost per year, $22,900.00 at the time LeClair was decided, and subtracted
the sum of: Jeremy’s qualification for student loans, grants, and work
study; Jeremy’s expected financial contribution, including his savings, as
determined by the college’s financial aid office; and any contributions
from Jeremy’s grandparents. The end result amounted to Mr. LeClair having to pay $8,056.00.18
Prior to 1987, RSA § 458:17 also authorized courts to order divorced
parents to place money in a trust for the maintenance and education of a
minor child.19 In 1987, however, the New Hampshire legislature repealed
and then reenacted the trust fund statute, which allowed courts to establish
trusts for the education of a child who is eighteen years of age or older if
the child is in college.20 Relying on this legislative action, the New Hampshire Supreme Court ruled that RSA § 458:20 specifically granted superior
courts the authority to order a parent to contribute toward an adult child’s
educational expenses.21 In making this ruling, the Court found a clear intent by the legislature to recognize a superior court judge’s authority to
order parents, consistent with their means, to pay their child’s secondary
education expenses.22 When making this type of order, however, the superior court can only order a divorced parent to pay a reasonable portion of
the educational expenses.23
Three recent cases have clarified the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s
holding in LeClair.24 In In re Gilmore,25 the Court stated that a parent’s
obligation to pay child support ceases when the child turns eighteen or
graduates from high school, whichever is later.26 However, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court took the opportunity to reaffirm the Court’s
decision in LeClair by saying that RSA § 458:35-c does not place a time
limit on a parent’s obligation to pay for reasonable college expenses.27 The
Court found that the purpose of RSA § 458:35-c was to ensure that both
parents share responsibility for supporting their children according to the
relative percentage of each parent’s income.28
18. Id. (affirming the judgment of the superior court).
19. Id. at 1353.
20. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:20 (1992).
21. LeClair, 624 A.2d at 1353.
22. Id.
23. Azzi v. Azzi, 392 A.2d 148, 151 (N.H. 1978).
24. See generally In re Barrett, 841 A.2d 74 (N.H. 2004); In re Breault, 821 A.2d at 1118; In re
Gilmore, 803 A.2d 601 (N.H. 2002) (cases decided after LeClair that further clarify the Court’s ruling).
25. 803 A.2d 601.
26. Id. at 601, 603 (citing N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:35-c (1992)).
27. In re Gilmore, 803 A.2d at 603.
28. In re Barrett, 841 A.2d at 77.
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While there was no dispute over the superior court’s authority to order
the father to contribute to his daughter’s education in In re Gilmore, there
was an objection to paying what was considered incidental costs.29 This
argument allowed the Supreme Court to identify, for the first time in New
Hampshire, what the Court considered “educational expenses.”30 The
Court defined educational expenses as those that are directly related to a
child’s college education.31 These expenses include “tuition, books, room,
board, and other directly related fees.”32 Educational expenses do not include transportation costs, medical expenses, or clothing, which Mr. Gilmore was originally required to pay.33 The Gilmore Court stated that defining educational expenses more broadly would essentially require a parent to pay additional child support, which would conflict with RSA §
458:35-c.34
In In re Breault,35 the Court held that, pursuant to RSA § 458:35-c, a
trial court has the authority to issue an original or modified child support
order that terminates when the child graduates from college.36 The New
Hampshire Supreme Court again reaffirmed LeClair by stating that a superior court has the discretion, in both original and modified orders, to require divorced parents to contribute to their children’s college education.37
However, the Breault Court held that any order requiring divorced parents
to contribute to their child’s post-secondary education must be “equitable
in the light of the circumstances of all of the parties.”38
By the end of 2002, it was well established in New Hampshire that a
superior court judge could require divorced parents to pay for their child’s
educational expenses as long as the order followed the requirements set
forth in LeClair, In re Breault, and In re Gilmore.39 However, imminent
legislative change would soon alter the State’s child support law and effectively remove some judicial discretion from the superior courts.

29. 803 A.2d at 603.
30. Id. at 604.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 603.
34. Id. at 604.
35. 821 A.2d 1118.
36. Id. at 1121.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See generally In re Breault, 821 A.2d at 1121; In re Gilmore, 803 A.2d at 603; LeClair, 624
A.2d at 1353 (cases outlining the requirements imposed on divorced parents relating to payment of a
child’s college expenses).
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B. 2004 New Hampshire Amendment
In January of 2003, the New Hampshire legislature introduced a bill
proposing to change the existing law regarding post-secondary education
orders.40 The previous statute, which applied before the amendment was
introduced, granted superior courts the authority to order divorced parents
to contribute to their child’s post-secondary educational expenses.41 This
new bill was drafted to amend RSA § 458:17 by inserting the following
provision: “No child support order shall require a parent to contribute to an
adult child’s college expenses or other educational expenses beyond the
completion of high school.”42 The purpose of this provision, according to
the bill’s sponsor, was to remove a trial judge’s discretion when ordering
divorced parents to contribute to their adult child’s college expenses.43
Both the Senate and the House of Representatives voted in favor of the bill,
and on January 1, 2004, the new child support provision took effect.44 The
new law is codified as RSA § 458:17(XI-a).45 As a result of this new statutory amendment, LeClair and its progeny were overruled.
C. State Laws Comparable to the Recent New Hampshire Amendment
While the New Hampshire legislature recently overturned existing case
law regarding post-secondary education support, many other states have
laws similar to RSA § 458:17(XI-a). For instance, in Florida, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal ruled in Klein v. Klein46 that a parent is not responsible for support after a child reaches his or her eighteenth birthday.47
In Klein, the parties were married for sixteen years and had two children.48
At all times during the marriage, the mother was totally dependent on the
father for support.49 As a result, the court awarded the wife a “lump sum
alimony” payment as well as monthly alimony payments in order to maintain her accustomed living arrangements.50 However, the court refused to
extend the father’s payouts to include support payments for his daughter’s
college expenses.51 The court reasoned that since college attendance does
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

N.H. H. 299, 158th Gen. Ct., 2d Year (2003).
See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:17(I) (1992); LeClair, 624 A.2d at 1353.
N.H. H. 299, 158th Gen. Ct., 2d Year.
Id.
Id.
Id.
413 So. 2d 1297 (Fla. 4th Dist. App. 1982).
Id. at 1300.
Id. at 1298.
Id.
Id. at 1299.
Id. at 1300.
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not render a child a legal dependant, courts do not have the authority to
require parents to furnish their offspring with such an advanced education.52
In Ohio, the law regarding payment of post-secondary education expenses is well settled and set forth in Bardes v. Todd.53 In Bardes, the
court restated the rule regarding payment of post-secondary educational
expenses as follows: without a specific agreement of the parties and the
subsequent adoption of the agreement by a trial court, a judge generally
has no authority to issue orders setting aside money for future college expenses of a minor child.54 However, this rule only applies if the money
would be used after the child reaches the age of majority.55 In addition, the
Bardes court stated that no case law supported a holding that attending a
college of one’s choice is a fundamental right guaranteed by the federal
Constitution, even for the most gifted of children.56
A similar bright-line rule applies to forced post-secondary education
payments in Texas. In the case of Woodruff v. Woodruff,57 the father of a
minor son attending college petitioned the court to reduce his child support
payments due to a “changed condition.”58 The father argued that since the
son was in college, and college was not a “necessity of life,” the son’s
changed condition warranted a reduction in child support.59 Under Texas
law, each parent has a duty to support his or her minor children and provide them with necessities of life.60 Necessities of life include food, clothing, shelter, and medical attention.61
The Woodruff court held that a college education does not fit under the
statutory definition of necessity of life but is instead a “special advantage.”62 The Texas court conceded that the court could not order a divorced parent to pay for post-secondary education costs of their children
under state law.63 However, the court stated that if the parties voluntarily
agreed to pay educational expenses, the agreement would preclude a reduction in child support.64 Because of the agreement in this case, Mr. Wood-

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
746 N.E.2d 229, 235 (Ohio App. 1st Dist. 2000).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 234.
487 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
Id. at 793.
Id. at 792-93.
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 4.02 (1972).
Id.
487 S.W.2d at 793.
Id.
Id.
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ruff was not able to take advantage of Texas’ pro-divorcee rule, and his
child support payments were not reduced.65
Payment toward post-secondary education in Massachusetts, while differing from the rules in Florida, Ohio, and Texas, still favors divorced parents by placing a burden on the children to meet the strict statutory requirements.66 An illustration of this strict requirement occurred in L.W.K.
v. E.R.C.,67 where the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court answered the
question of whether a judge may posthumously set aside a lump sum payment in trust as security for future educational support of a child.68 The
Court found that the Massachusetts legislature explicitly provided that in
some circumstances, parents have an obligation to provide educational
support for their children who have attained the age of eighteen.69 Similar
to the previous version of RSA § 458:17(I), in Massachusetts, a judge may
make appropriate orders of maintenance, support, and education for any
child who has reached the age of eighteen.70 However, the Massachusetts
legislature restricts application of this statute to individuals who have not
attained the age of twenty-one, who are domiciled in the home of a parent,
and who are principally dependent upon said parent for maintenance.71
Although this statute places a significant burden upon parents to support
their children, unlike the laws in effect in New Hampshire and Florida, the
Massachusetts statute places limitations on educational support awards if
the terms of the statute are not strictly complied with.72 This difference is
shown in L.W.K. where the Court overturned the educational trust because
there was no showing that the beneficiary, a ten-year-old boy, would meet
the statutory requirements set forth in the Massachusetts statute.73
Four years after L.W.K. was decided, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts revisited the issue of assigning post-secondary education payments to
divorced parents in Ketterle v. Ketterle.74 In Ketterle, the father of three
children objected to being assigned the responsibility of paying for the
educational expenses of his three children.75 The court, relying on precedent, stated, “[a]s a general rule, support orders regarding the future pay65. Id.
66. See generally L.W.K. v. E.R.C., 735 N.E.2d 359 (Mass. 2000); Ketterle v. Ketterle, 814 N.E.2d
385 (Mass. App. 2004) (examples of Massachusetts cases where children must meet strict statutory
requirements in order for their divorced parents to be ordered to pay for their college education).
67. 735 N.E.2d 359 (Mass. 2000).
68. Id. at 370.
69. Id.
70. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209C § 9 (2004).
71. Id.
72. L.W.K., 735 N.E.2d at 371.
73. Id.
74. 814 N.E.2d at 387.
75. Id. at 391.
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ment of post-high school educational costs are premature and should not be
made.”76 The reason for this rule, according to the court, is that “[s]upport
orders are meant to address the current and not the future needs of children.”77 As a result, the court overturned the father’s support obligations
for his younger children, then aged thirteen and ten.78 However, because
college was imminent for the oldest child, the court upheld the trial court
ruling ordering Mr. Ketterle to pay for that child’s educational expenses.79
In Pennsylvania, similar to the situation in New Hampshire, the law
requiring divorced parents to pay for post-secondary education was in a
state of flux in the mid-1990’s.80 Prior to 1995, the rule, as set forth by
statute, stated that a court may order either or both parents who are divorced to provide equitably for educational costs of their child.81 This rule
applied whenever a parent sought a support order – regardless of whether
the child had reached the age of eighteen.82 Additionally, educational expense orders are only issued after a child makes a reasonable effort to apply for scholarships, grants and work-study assistance.83 The Pennsylvania
legislature, in making these provisions, stated that each parent shared the
responsibility of providing post-secondary education support.84
Brown v. Brown,85 however, limited the scope of this statute slightly.86
In Brown, Robert, a law student, requested that his father continue to provide medical insurance for him while he was in school.87 In addition,
Robert requested that he be given a monthly allowance of $150.00.88 The
court ruled against Robert because the court found that the legislature intended the Pennsylvania child support laws to limit post-secondary education to the pursuit of an undergraduate education leading to a bachelor’s
degree.89 Therefore, the term “college” in Pennsylvania does not include
within its ambit post-graduate degrees or professional-level training.90
In 1995, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in the seminal case of Curtis v. Kline,91 abolished the framework established under the Pennsylvania
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
23 Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. § 4327(a) (1994).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
474 A.2d 1168 (Pa. Super. 1984).
Id. at 1169.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1170.
Id.
666 A.2d 265 (Pa. 1995).
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statute and Brown v. Brown.92 In Curtis, the Court held that requiring parents to pay for post-secondary education was a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.93 In overruling established statutory law, the Court held that there
was no rational basis for a state government to require only certain adult
citizens to pay for post-secondary education expenses.94 In so holding, the
Court effectively voiced displeasure for the statute, which required only
non-intact families to provide such expenses for their children.95
D. State Laws Differing from the Recent New Hampshire Amendment
Not every state shares New Hampshire’s view that divorced parents
should not be required to pay for a child’s post-secondary education.96 An
example contrary to New Hampshire’s view is evident in the California
case Hale v. Hale.97 In Hale, the parties divorced when their son was four
years old, and the court entered a child support order in favor of the mother
who received custody of the boy.98 When the boy turned eighteen and was
admitted to Princeton University, the mother petitioned the court for an
increase in support to cover additional expenses that attending college
would bring upon the family.99
The question the court answered in Hale was whether a trial court had
the authority to make an order to cover the necessary expenses of higher
education.100 The court ruled that California law gave courts, rather than
parents, the right to make ultimate decisions regarding the welfare of children when divorce proceedings have been initiated.101 The court’s ruling
was based on the idea that when domestic relations are strained, trial
courts, based on all the facts and circumstances, should determine the
proper amount of support each child is entitled to receive.102 If attending
college is in the best interest of the child, then a trial court’s support order
can include the requirement that a parent pay for their child’s secondary
education as long as the court thinks the parent is financially secure.103

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 270.
Id.
Id. at 269-70.
Id. at 269.
Hale, 132 P.2d at 68.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 68-69.
Id. at 69.
Id.
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The Hale court determined that there was an overriding public policy
in California for all citizens to receive a college education.104 According to
the court, this policy was supported by the fact that many of the State’s
higher learning institutions were maintained at the public’s expense.105
This policy was affirmed seven years later in Rawley v. Rawley,106 when
the court again addressed the issue of whether a parent can be compelled to
pay for their child’s college education.107 While the father in Rawley conceded that he was required to pay for maintenance and support of his child,
he argued that he was under no legal duty to pay for college expenses.108
In affirming Hale, the Rawley court said that as long as trial courts do not
abuse their discretion, they will continue to have the ability to order a parent to pay for their child’s higher education.109 However, the Rawley court
did acknowledge the California trial court’s authority to modify any support order should the circumstances of either party change. 110
Another state that allows courts to issue support orders requiring divorced parents to pay for post-secondary education expenses is Illinois.111
In Illinois, courts are governed by the Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (“the Act”), which states that “[a] court may . . . make [a] provision for the educational expenses of the child or children of the parties,
whether of minor or majority age.”112 According to the Act, educational
expenses include, among other things, room, board, dues, tuition, transportation, books, fees, registration and application costs, medical expenses,
and living expenses during the school year and recess.113
The Act was relied upon in In re Marriage of Sreenan,114 where a father appealed the trial court’s ruling ordering him to pay the college education expenses of two of his children.115 The father argued that because the
relationship between himself and his children had deteriorated, he should
not have to make any post-secondary education support payments.116 The
court rejected the father’s argument and upheld the order requiring him to
contribute to his children’s educational expenses because the Act’s support

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id.
210 P.2d 891 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1949).
Id. at 892.
Id. at 893.
Id.
Id.
750 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 513(a)(2).
Id.
Id.
402 N.E.2d 348 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1980).
Id. at 349.
Id. at 350.
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obligation was not conditioned on whether a parent had a good, on-going
relationship with their child.117
The “educational expenses” clause of the Act was challenged six years
later in In re Pearson,118 when a divorced father challenged the trial court’s
support order that included a provision providing for the college education
of his youngest child.119 The father argued that the trial court erred by imposing upon him a support order that prevented him from paying his
monthly expenses.120 In deciding this matter, the Court looked to the Act,
which outlined the relevant factors a court should consider before making
an award determination.121
The guidelines set forth in the Act include: the financial resources of
both parents; the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the
parties remained married; the financial resources of the child; and the
child’s academic performance.122 After considering all of the listed factors,
the Pearson Court ruled that the Act’s “educational expense” clause does
not mandate that divorced parents must pay for a child’s post-secondary
education in all cases; the clause just exists so that courts may order a party
to make education-related support payments.123 The Court held that the
legislature, in passing the Act, intended for the trial court to have broad
discretion when ordering a parent to contribute to their child’s college education.124
A recent Illinois case outlined exactly how much discretion a trial
court is afforded in ordering divorced parents to pay for educational expenses. In In re Cianchetti,125 the court ordered the father to pay half of
the total cost of college expenses for each of his two daughters.126 The
father, in challenging the trial court’s order, argued that he was not in a
financial position to pay the ordered college costs, and, in addition, that a
person should not be required to pay for educational expenses that he or
she cannot afford.127
In ruling on the father’s arguments, the court reiterated the Illinois rule
that trial court decisions to award educational expenses can only be overturned if the decisions are against the “manifest weight of the evidence.”128
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 352.
490 N.E.2d 1274 (Ill. 1986).
Id. at 1275.
Id. at 1277.
Id. at 1275.
750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/513(b) (2005); In re Pearson, 490 N.E.2d at 1275.
490 N.E.2d at 1277.
Id.
815 N.E.2d 17 (Ill. App. 3d Dist. 2004).
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id.
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According to the court, a ruling against the manifest weight of the evidence
occurs when the opposite conclusion was clearly evident, or when a ruling
was unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence.129 Adhering to
the broad discretion given to the trial court, the Cianchetti court upheld the
support order and found no abuse of discretion existed because, despite the
added expense to the father’s budget, the court found he was able to make
similar payments in the past for high school expenses and child support.130
Similar to the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, New
York has codified a rule outlining payment of educational expenses by a
divorced parent.131 In New York, a trial court, taking into account all of
the facts and circumstances of the parties as well as the best interests of the
child, may include educational expenses for post-secondary education in a
basic child support order between divorced parents.132 The statute also
allows trial courts to determine the manner in which the non-custodial parent pays the required educational expenses, including direct payment to the
educational provider.133
Prior to the enactment of this statutory provision, New York trial
courts could only order a divorced parent to pay educational expenses if
“special circumstances” existed.134 In Kaplan v. Wallshein,135 the court
ruled that absent special circumstances or a voluntary agreement, a court
could not order divorced parents to pay for college education expenses of
their children.136 In determining whether special circumstances existed, the
court looked to three factors: the educational background of the parent; the
child’s academic ability; and the parent’s financial ability to provide for
the educational expenses.137 Only when all of these factors are met, a trial
court can require a divorced parent to provide the necessary expenses.138
However, once the New York legislature passed the educational expenses provision, the special circumstances requirement New York courts
had previously relied upon no longer applied to divorced parents.139 In
Manno v. Manno,140 the court affirmed the new statutory provision, holding that a court may properly direct a parent to contribute to a child’s col-

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id. at 21-22.
N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 240(1-b)(c)(7).
Id.
Id.
See Kaplan v. Wallshein, 57 A.D.2d 828, 829 (N.Y. App. Div. 2nd Dept. 1977).
57 A.D.2d 828.
See id. at 829.
See id.
See id.
Manno v. Manno, 196 A.D.2d 488, 491 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 1993).
196 A.D.2d 488.
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lege education, even in the absence of special circumstances.141 The
Manno court narrowed the scope of the new law by warning trial courts not
to “improvidently exercise” their discretion in ordering college education
payments.142
The Manno court also set forth factors that a trial court must consider
before ordering educational expenses.143 These factors include: the circumstances of the case; the circumstances of the respective parties; the best
interests of the children; and the requirements of justice.144 The court resolved Manno by holding that the father should not have been ordered to
pay for his child’s college education expenses because the support order
was too burdensome since half of the man’s take-home pay was deducted.145 In reaching this conclusion, the Manno court followed the
newly enacted statute as well as the court-imposed educational expense
factors.146
The law in New Jersey regarding child support and educational expenses differs from those in Illinois and New York because New Jersey
does not have a codified rule permitting trial courts to include such expenses in support orders. As a result, the New Jersey Supreme Court has
given trial courts the discretion to include post-secondary education expenses when issuing support orders to divorcees.147 For example, in Khalaf v. Khalaf,148 the Court, deciding the proper support that the father
should pay to his ex-wife and son, determined that college expenses can be
included as part of a child support order.149 Khalaf presented the unique
situation of parents who separated while paying for their son’s college
education.150 After the parties separated, the father refused to continue
paying his son’s college expenses.151
In deciding Khalaf, the Court assumed that had it not been for the
separation, the son’s tuition and expenses would have continued to been
provided by his parents.152 While recognizing a trend towards higher education, the Court authorized mandatory education provisions in future child

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 491.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 492.
Id.
Khalaf v. Khalaf, 275 A.2d 132 (N.J. 1971).
Id..
Id. at 136-37.
Id. at 136.
Id.
Id.
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support orders as long as the child showed a scholastic aptitude and the
parents were able to afford the added expense.153
Five years after Khalaf was decided, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in
Newburgh v. Arrigo,154 expanded the scope of parental responsibility by
including the duty to pay for a child’s college and post-graduate educations.155 The Newburgh Court viewed education as a flexible concept that
varies depending on the circumstances.156 Consequently, the Court stated
that the influx of a wide variety of educational institutions meant that postsecondary education was available to anyone who wished to attend.157 As
a result of this changing atmosphere, the Court came to the conclusion that
financially capable parents should be required to contribute to their children’s higher education.158
In establishing this new requirement, the Court listed twelve relevant
factors that should be considered when making an education expense order
including: whether the parent would have contributed towards the cost of
the education; the amount of contribution sought by the child; the ability of
the parent to pay the requested cost; the financial resources of the child;
and the child’s relationship to the paying parent.159 The Newburgh decision provides the most comprehensive set of factors a court should consider when deciding whether to order parents to pay child support in the
form of post-secondary education expenses.
Maryland is another state that allows spousal support orders to include
college educations for couples’ marital children.160 In Wooddy v.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 137.
443 A.2d 1031 (N.J. 1982).
Id. at 1038.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1038-39. The twelve factors mentioned by the court include:
(1) whether the parent, if still living with the child, would have contributed toward the costs
of the requested higher education; (2) the effect of the background, values and goals of the
parent on the reasonableness of the expectation of the child for higher education; (3) the
amount of the contribution sought by the child for the cost of higher education; (4) the ability of the parent to pay that cost; (5) the relationship of the requested contribution to the
kind of school or course of study sought by the child; (6) the financial resources of both parents; (7) the commitment to and aptitude of the child for the requested education; (8) the financial resources of the child, including assets owned individually or held in custodianship
or trust; (9) the ability of the child to earn income during the school year or on vacation;
(10) the availability of financial aid in the form of college grants and loans; (11) the child’s
relationship to the paying parent, including mutual affection and shared goals as well as responsiveness to parental advice and guidance; and (12) the relationship of the education requested to any prior training and to the overall long-range goals of the child.

Id.
160. 265 A.2d 467 (Md. 1970).
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Wooddy,161 the Court stated that a college degree is a necessity if the
child’s station in life justifies a higher education.162 As a result, the Court
held that as long as a parent is financially able to provide support for a
post-secondary education, fighting this responsibility is no longer an option
for a parent in Maryland.163
Similarly, in Oregon, trial courts are permitted to “set aside, alter or
modify . . . [a divorce] decree as may provide for . . . the nurture and/or
education [of the parties’ children].”164 In upholding the law, the Court
ignored the argument that a child who reaches the age of majority is not
eligible to receive the benefits of post-secondary education expenses.165
To support the Court’s decision, the Court, quoting Blackstone’s Commentaries, eloquently stated that “[t]he last duty of parents to their children is
that of giving them an education suitable to their station in life; a duty
pointed out by reason and by far the greatest importance of any.”166
In coming out in favor of ordering financial support for higher education, the Court in Jackman v. Short167 took the now antiquated view that a
child of divorced parents is in greater need of the help that a college education can provide than a child living in a home with marital harmony.168 To
the Court’s credit though, the Oregon Supreme Court foreshadowed future
state court rulings when the Court looked at a parent’s financial ability to
pay the requested education expenses before issuing a support order to that
effect.169
As the previous parts of this article have illustrated, there is a major
divide among state courts and legislatures on the issue of ordering divorced
parents to contribute to their child’s post-secondary education. While
many states have drafted statutes or developed their own set of factors or
circumstances trial courts must look to before ordering parents to pay for
their child’s higher education costs, only two states, New Hampshire and
Pennsylvania, have addressed whether ordering divorced parents to make
“educational expense” payments violates that parent’s equal protection
rights.170

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 467.
Id. at 472.
Id.
Jackman v. Short, 109 P.2d 860, 865 (Or. 1941).
Id.
Id. at 866 (quoting William Blackstone, Commentaries vol. 1, 424).
109 P.2d 860.
Id. at 872.
Id. at 872-73.
LeClair, 624 A.2d at 1355-57; Curtis, 666 A.2d at 268-70.
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III. THE EQUAL PROTECTION ARGUMENT
Equal protection analysis requires courts to review the right in question
utilizing one of three tests set forth by the United States Supreme Court:
(1) strict scrutiny;171 (2) intermediate scrutiny;172 or (3) rational basis review.173 The standard applied to the right in question determines which
party has the burden of proof in the case.174 For example, if a law that discriminates based on race is challenged, the strict scrutiny standard requires
the government to prove the law serves a compelling government interest,
and to show that the law is narrowly tailored to fit the compelling interest.175 The next level of equal protection analysis, intermediate scrutiny,
requires the government to prove that the challenged law serves an important government interest that the law is substantially related to achieving
those interests.176 Under rational basis review, however, the lowest level of
scrutiny under equal protection challenges, the challenged law merely
needs to serve a legitimate government purpose in order to pass constitutional muster.177 Rational basis review is the easiest equal protection standard for a law to survive because as long as there is some legitimate government purpose, the law can be over-inclusive or under-inclusive and still
be rationally related to the stated government interest.178
A. Equal Protection Arguments Supporting the New Hampshire Amendment
When the New Hampshire legislature passed RSA § 458:17(XI-a) in
January 2004, one of the law’s stated purposes was to remove the discretion of superior court judges to order parents to pay for a child’s postsecondary education.179 However, the recent New Hampshire law does not
mention the fact that mandatory post-secondary education payments vio-

171. E.g. Loving v. Va., 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (holding race, as a suspect classification, warrants
the most rigid scrutiny).
172. E.g. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976) (holding that gender differences, while not as
suspect as race, deserve a heightened level of scrutiny).
173. E.g. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) (holding that mental
retardation, because it is an immutable characteristic, deserves only rational basis review and not
heightened scrutiny).
174. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 206 (2005).
175. See e.g. id. at 440.
176. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (gender discrimination case).
177. See e.g. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447 (classification involving individuals who were mentally
retarded).
178. See generally e.g. id. at 442, 454 (one of many cases that find a legitimate purpose to a law that
arguably includes too many people or not enough people when applied).
179. N.H. H. 299, 158th Gen. Ct., 2d Year.
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late divorced parents’ equal protection rights. This argument was made
and addressed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Curtis.180
Curtis was a divorced father who petitioned the Court to terminate his
child support obligation for his two oldest children, both of whom were
attending college.181 In his petition, Curtis challenged the Pennsylvania
statute, which permitted trial courts to issue orders requiring divorced parents to pay for their children’s higher education.182 As a result, Curtis
made a constitutional challenge arguing that the Pennsylvania statute was
unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.183 According to the Curtis Court, the essence of
equal protection is to treat persons in “like circumstances” similarly, but
equal protection does not require that all persons under all circumstances
enjoy identical protection under the law.184 States are allowed to classify
different groups, and thereby treat them unequally, as long as the classifications are not arbitrary, and the classifications bear a reasonable relationship to the stated purpose of the legislation.185
The Curtis Court, in deciding this post-secondary education issue, applied the rational basis test because the statute, in the Court’s opinion, did
not implicate a suspect class or infringe upon any fundamental right.186
Further, the Court stated that an individual right to post-secondary education is not provided by the United States Constitution or the Pennsylvania
Constitution.187 The Court found the Pennsylvania legislature’s purpose in
passing the statute was to require “some parental financial assistance for a
higher education for children of parents who are . . . divorced.”188 Although the Court recognized that some young adults do in fact need financial assistance to attend higher education institutions, the Court took issue
with the state “selectively . . . compel[ling]” only parents from non-intact
families to provide such assistance.189 As a result, the Curtis Court held
that there was no rational basis for the State to require divorced parents to
financially provide for their adult children’s post-secondary education.190
To support the Court’s decision, the Court discussed a conceivable hypothetical situation that demonstrated the arbitrariness of the Pennsylvania
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

666 A.2d at 267.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 268-69.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 269.
Id.
Id. at 269-70.
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statute.191 Under the statute, which the Court ultimately invalidated, the
Court found it possible for a divorced parent to have two children, each
from a separate marriage, with one child residing with the parent and one
child not residing with the parent.192 In this situation, the Court stated that
the statute would require the parent to provide post-secondary education
support for the second child, but would not require the parent to provide
support for the first child. The Court then shifted the equal protection focus from the divorced parent to the young adult in need of education assistance.193 As a result, the Court ruled that the classification detailed in the
hypothetical treated similarly situated young adults in need of higher education assistance unequally.194 Since no rational reason existed to treat
children of divorce differently than children of marriage, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court overturned the discriminatory statute.195
B. Equal Protection Arguments Contravening the New Hampshire
Amendment
Before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling in Curtis, and before
the New Hampshire legislature amended RSA § 458:17 by removing the
trial court’s power to order divorced parents to contribute to their adult
child’s education, the law in New Hampshire was controlled by LeClair,
which addressed the equal protection argument as it related to divorced
parents.196
In LeClair, the Court ordered the plaintiff father, Ronald LeClair, to
contribute to the costs of his adult son’s college education.197 In disagreeing with the lower court’s order, LeClair appealed the decision arguing that
the New Hampshire statute violated his, and all divorced parents’, equal
protection rights.198 LeClair argued that ordering divorced parents to pay
for an adult child’s college expenses is a violation of the State and Federal
Constitutions because the courts do not have the same power to issue a
similar order to a married parent.199 While it was unclear whether the
plaintiff properly preserved the equal protection issue for appeal, the Court
191. Id. at 270
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. 624 A.2d at 1355-58.
197. Id. at 1352.
198. Id. at 1355. Note that the New Hampshire statute in question when LeClair was decided was
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:17(I).
199. Id. (The plaintiff cited Part I, Article 2 of the New Hampshire Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution as the provisions violated by N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 458:17 (I).).
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decided to address the issue anyway “because similar claims may [arise] in
the future.”200
In deciding the equal protection issue, the Court relied on the New
Hampshire State Constitution because the Federal Constitution did not
offer greater protection under the equal protection provisions.201 The
Court, before deciding which level of scrutiny to apply to this issue in New
Hampshire, asked whether the state action in question treated similarly
situated persons differently.202 The Court ruled that under the New Hampshire statute, married parents and divorced parents were similarly situated.203 Additionally, the Court stated that under New Hampshire law,
equal protection does not forbid group classifications, but requires courts
to examine the individual rights affected as well as the purpose and scope
of the created classifications.204
The LeClair Court first considered the “strict scrutiny” test, which puts
the onus on the government to show a compelling state interest to determine the classification’s validity.205 In order for strict scrutiny to apply in
New Hampshire, the suspect classification must be based on “race, creed,
color, gender, national origin, or legitimacy” or affect a fundamental
right.206 The Court, relying on precedent, stated that decisions regarding
custody and the rearing of minor children involve fundamental rights.207
The LeClair Court next addressed the “rational basis” test, where state
legislation is presumed to be valid and will be upheld if the classification
drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.208
According to New Hampshire precedent, if no suspect class or fundamental or substantive is right involved, rational basis review is applied, especially when economic classifications are at issue.209 The LeClair Court
then cited Couture v. Couture,210 where the New Hampshire Supreme
Court held that the classification between divorced parents with minor
children and divorced adults without minor children in an alimony scheme
should be addressed under the rational basis test.211

200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1355-56 (citing State v. LaPorte, 587 A.2d 1237, 1239 (N.H. 1991) and Merrill v. City of
Manchester, 466 A.2d 923, 927 (N.H. 1983)).
207. Id. at 1356 (citing Provencal v. Provencal, 451 A.2d 374, 377 (N.H. 1982)).
208. Id.
209. Id. (quoting Petition of State Employees’ Assn. v. Goulette, 529 A.2d 968, 971 (1987)).
210. 471 A.2d 1191 (N.H. 1984).
211. Leclair, 624 A.2d at 1356 (citing Couture, 471 A.2d at 1192).
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After outlining both equal protection options, the LeClair Court, in
analogizing the case to Couture, chose to apply rational basis review of the
New Hampshire statute because LeClair’s argument rested primarily on an
economic issue.212 However, the Court did not find any fundamental or
important substantive right under the New Hampshire Constitution infringed by the statute.213 The Court found that the statute’s objective was
to ensure that children of divorced parents would not be unjustly deprived
of opportunities they otherwise would have received had their parents not
divorced.214 Based on the statute’s policy, the Court held that New Hampshire had a legitimate state interest in providing educational opportunities
to children whose families were no longer intact.215
The LeClair Court’s ruling was based on the long-standing power of
New Hampshire superior courts’ judges to oversee financial arrangements
of divorced families, including support decisions.216 The Court distinguished between intact families, where financial support of the family unit
is the unquestioned responsibility of an intact family, and divorced families, where conflicts and disputes often necessitate the court’s role in making financial orders.217 This distinction, in the Court’s eyes, supported the
legislature’s decision to require divorced parents to contribute to their adult
child’s post-secondary education because children of divorce may be less
likely than children of intact families to receive financial support from both
of their parents.218
Two years after LeClair was decided, Curtis addressed the LeClair
Court’s decision to uphold the New Hampshire statute based on a legitimate state interest.219 The Curtis Court did not follow the rationale in LeClair, in part, because the Court disagreed with the classification the LeClair Court applied to the post-secondary education issue.220 In the eyes of
the Curtis Court, the issue was not whether the classification treated married parents and divorced parents differently, but whether similarly situated
young adults in need of financial assistance may be treated differently.221
By applying the same rational basis test as the LeClair Court applied, Curtis struck down the Pennsylvania law permitting trial courts to issue orders

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id.
Id. at 1356-57.
Id. at 1357.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
666 A.2d at 270.
Id.
Id.

File: Leonard - 4 Pierce L. Rev. 507

526

Created on: 6/7/2006 2:41:00 PM

PIERCE LAW REVIEW

Last Printed: 6/11/2006 9:31:00 PM

Vol. 4, No. 3

requiring divorced parents to provide for their adult child’s post-secondary
education.222
The reason for the opposing ruling, according to the Curtis Court, was
that certain young adults who needed financial assistance to attain a higher
education, namely children of divorce, should not be the only children who
have the legal means to overcome their financial difficulties (by going to
court and getting a court order against their parent(s)).223 The Curtis Court
ruled that the Pennsylvania statute unconstitutionally violated the equal
protection rights of young adults because those children whose parents
were still married had no access to the same judicial involvement, which
could grant them the financial assistance.224 As a result, the Curtis Court
held that “no rational reason [existed for why] those similarly situated with
respect to needing funds for [post-secondary] education, should be treated
unequally.”225
IV. ANALYSIS: ADVOCATING IN FAVOR OF THE NEW HAMPSHIRE
AMENDMENT
The New Hampshire law prohibiting judges from ordering divorced
parents to pay for higher education costs, and thereby removing judicial
discretion, is the model that all states, which permit judicial discretion
when making these types of orders, should adopt. Not only do postsecondary education orders violate the equal protection rights of the divorced parents, but as Curtis pointed out, the equal protection rights of
children from intact families is also violated.226 The simplest solution is
for all states to remove judicial discretion from the college decision when
dealing with divorced families. Parents should be able to decide whether
they are willing, and financially able, to pay for their children’s college
education without any outside influences.
One of the unresolved issues between the states is what exactly constitutes “educational expenses,” and what judges can order parents to pay for.
In New Hampshire, prior to the 2004 amendment, educational expenses
were defined as “tuition, books, room, board, and other directly related
fees.”227 However, in addition to the “educational expenses” outlined by
the New Hampshire courts, Illinois permits judges to go further by allow222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id.
Id. at 269-70.
Id.
Id. at 270.
Id.
In re Gilmore, 803 A.2d at 604.
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ing them to order parents to pay for college dues and fees, transportation
expenses, registration and application costs, medical expenses, and living
expenses incurred during the school year or during school recess.228 If a
child turned eighteen and decided against going to college, courts would
have no power to order parents to make these types of financial contributions. But, since some states have determined that parents not only have a
responsibility but an obligation to provide for their child’s college education, those states have permitted courts to make educational support orders
despite the fact that the orders clearly violate the equal protection rights of
those parents.
Two additional problems remain: (1) what happens when parents cannot afford to make the court ordered education contribution while continuing to pay the monthly expenses they incur; and (2) what happens if the
policy of an intact family provided that the children are solely responsible
for paying their own way through college, but the parents subsequently
divorce?
The first issue has been discussed in some state court opinions. In Illinois, an appeals court ignored a parent’s request to remove an order requiring him to pay for his children’s college education because the court found
the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in making the order.229
The Illinois appeals court followed state policy and required the father to
make post-secondary education payments rather than consider his situation
and what the added expenses would do to his standard of living. In most
states that permit courts to issue educational orders, the financial limitations of the parents are considered before an order is made.
In Texas, however, a parent’s finances are never considered by the
court because parents are only required to provide their children with the
“necessities of life,” which include food, clothing, shelter and medical attention.230 The Texas format is much more sensible because it not only
ensures children are adequately provided for, but it allows parents, and not
courts, to determine whether they can afford to pay for college expenses.
More importantly, however, the Texas law allows parents to decide
whether they want to pay for those expenses. Since college educations are
not considered fundamental rights in this country, a parent’s desire and
financial capability should be the overriding factors in determining
whether to pay for their child’s college expenses.
The second issue has only been addressed in New Jersey where courts
are required to consider whether a parent would have contributed towards
228. 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/513(a)(2).
229. In re Marriage of Cianchetti, 815 N.E.2d at 22.
230. Woodruff, 487 S.W.2d at 793.
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the cost of a child’s college education.231 Courts make the most egregious
equal protection violations in these situations. Imagine a family where for
the entirety of childhood, the child’s parents encouraged the child to go to
college, but always told the child that they would not provide any financial
help, either for personal reasons or financial reasons. If this were the
stated family policy and the child always knew it, why should a court be
allowed to issue an order requiring one or both divorced parents to contribute to their child’s college education just because they got divorced? This
example demonstrates a clear violation of a person’s equal protection
rights since a court cannot step into an intact family and issue the same
type of order. So while considering a parent’s intent about paying for college prior to divorce is a step in the right direction, parents in similar situations should never be forced to pay for college expenses.
In addition to infringing the equal protection rights of parents who are
divorced, states that allow judges to issue educational orders also violate
the equal protection rights of children of intact families. Since postsecondary education is not a fundamental right, courts, when issuing orders
for children of divorce, infringe on the rights of children from intact families since they have no remedy if their parents are unwilling to pay for college. As the Curtis Court points out, there is no rational reason why similarly situated young adults who are in need of educational funds should be
denied them just because their parents have stayed together.232 As a result,
states that allow courts to issue educational orders are actually punishing
children whose parents cannot afford to pay for their college expenses, for
whatever reason, because the children’s parents remained married. Therefore, states, like California, that have a policy for all citizens to receive
college educations are indirectly rewarding divorce by not permitting all
children to have access to the courts should their parents decide not to pay
for post-secondary education expenses.
V. CONCLUSION
Given all of the potential problems with courts issuing educational orders, not to mention the different standards in states across the country, all
states should follow New Hampshire’s lead and pass laws removing judicial discretion from all post-secondary education issues. The result would
be that parents would only have to pay for college if they volunteered to do
so. Following New Hampshire would not only prevent future litigation in
231. Newburgh, 443 A.2d at 1038-39.
232. 666 A.2d at 270.
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this area, but further problems between children receiving the funds and
their resentful parents could be avoided since parents would not be forced
to pay expenses they either could not afford or would never have volunteered to pay in the first place. In addition, children across the country
would be treated exactly the same since the remedies currently available
only to children of divorce would be eliminated. If the goal of all state
legal systems is to treat all people the same, regardless of where they live
or what their marital status is, only one option exists: for all states to remove judicial discretion and give parents the option of deciding whether or
not to pay for their child’s college expenses.

